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Climate Change, Environmental Terrorism, Eco-Terrorism and
Emerging Threats
Abstract
The footprint of human advancement has accelerated a climate variability with no
precedents, further driving devastating natural and social events. The decrease in basic
resources like water, has already been identified as a driver of violent conflicts, which have
given way to the strengthening of terrorist organizations that used the environment as a
tool of coercion. The damage caused to the earth’s ecosystem has additionally raised a
wave of defensive activism that was initially considered as eco-terrorism. While the original
eco-movements had not induced fatalities, recent extremist organizations are showing a
more violent anti-progress and pro-environment agenda. Added to these, the response of
the states against environmental activism initiatives, has spiked some concerns over the
repression of civil liberties, which may have the potential to fuel the angering of extreme
individuals, who can be prompted to take radicalized action. Using open source data, this
article shows that environmental terrorism represents an increasing security threat, which
in the future, might be worsened by the individual radicalization of marginalized
environmental extremists.
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Introduction
The evolution of human civilization has come at the expense of the
natural world. The unsustainable exploitation of natural resources and
modern humans’ creation of scarcity have unleashed unprecedented
climate variability and ecosystems collapse.1 As humans compete for
increasingly limited recourses, there is now a broader consensus that
the effects of climate change will contribute with an increase in internal
conflicts.2 This could resonate with the Malthusian discourse, which
states that the weight of population will be greater than the power of
the environment to produce sustainable resources.3 In such scenario,
the shortages of water, food, or land could fuel internal fights and
political violence.4 The effects of climate change are effectively driving
mass migration of climate refugees, which together with the escalation
of internal conflicts are largely favoring terrorism activities.5 This
appears to be setting seeding grounds for terrorists’ development,
nurturing a feedback loop of increased environmental insecurity
followed by an intensification in the security threat of these actors.6
In response to States’ climate inaction and animal rights, a movement
of civil activism has arose in recent years, which engaged in radical
practices that have been termed as eco-terrorism.7 These
environmental extremists have been associated with organizations as
the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) and the Animal Liberation Front
(ALF), whose actions da Silva and Liddick linked to an eco-terrorism
wave.8 As these groups do not generally seek harming human life, but
only property, which they consider as ecologically destructive, their
actions align more with those of ecotage that is violence against
inanimate objects and not directly with terrorism.9 Many have argued
therefore, that while the activities of these groups matched illegal
behaviors as sabotage, arson or trespassing, their intentions
significantly differed with those of terrorism.10 Yet, they have been
considered terrorists due to the uncritical acceptance of the term ecoterrorism, and its application to these kinds of illegal activities.11
On the other hand, the rise of organizations with more radical agendas,
such as the Individualities Towards the Savagery (ITS), which
disregards human life and holds violent ideologies against progress and
technologies, may challenge that proposition.12 As more developed
democracies are moving towards considering environmentalists as a
security threat, there are concerns about an increased state led
oppression of civil liberties against climate change activists.13 These
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policies can prompt further popular discontent and push the most
extreme activists towards radicalized movements such as the ITS.
Most international organizations, as the United Nations, the European
Community, and the G7, have come now to recognize the effects of
climate change as a security threat.14 The United States National
Security Strategy report of 2014, had already acknowledged that
climate change was going to be a catalyst for political violence and a
general security threat multiplier.15 In line with those concerns, groups
such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) for example, have
already shown their capacity to leverage the environment, by targeting
water resources as tools to manipulate the population.16 Therefore, the
tactics used by ISIS in Syria and Iraq, where they target the
environment to induce fear for political goals, represents another
example of environmental terrorism.
It follows, that climate change has been linked to two different forms of
terrorism. First, eco-terrorism, where individuals used violence against
properties and civil rights in defense of the environment or to direct
changes in environmental policy. Second, environmental terrorism,
where the destruction of the environment, either through war or acts of
terror, was used to exert fear in the population to achieve
organizational aims.
Using publicly available data, this article examined the basic evidence
for links between climate stress and terrorism. The existence of an ecoterrorism movement and the strategic use of environmental resources
by already stablished terrorist organizations were explored. This article
concludes that there is not enough evidence to claim the existence of a
current threat of eco-terrorism; however, extreme groups such as the
ITS may be of concern. There is instead a more consistent body of
literature exposing that stressed resources, and increased conflicts due
to climate change, provide terrorists with the opportunity to develop
new strategies and to extend grounds for recruitment. This would be in
line with the current development of environment terrorism.
Additionally, the states’ increasing repression on environmental
activism may have the potential to trigger these actors into a
radicalized stage that could eventually develop in a violent antiprogress extremism.
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The Links between Climate Change and Terrorism
Climate Change and its Environmental Effects
In about 200 years, the human population grew from just over 1 billion
to nearly 8 billion (Figure 1-A), and most of this growth was placed in
urban areas (Figure 1-B).17 While the yearly population change slowed
down from the late 80s onward (Figure 1-A), people density per square
kilometer has continued to climb during the same period (Figure 1-B).18
The footprint of these trends followed by a considerable increase in the
average carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere, particularly
from the 1960s onward (Figure 1-C).19 Similarly, a marked temperature
rise, for both, land and oceans, were noted since 1980 (Figure 1-D).20
Figure 1. Population Trends and Greenhouse Gas Emissions and
Temperature Change.

A) Source: Data from Worldometer information website (2020).21 Note: Over
the last 170 years, the world population has increased from about 1 billion to
close to 8 billion people. However, the annual rate of increase has been in
decline since the end of the 60s. B) Source: Data from Worldometer
information website (2020).22 Note: Over the last 70 years, people have
increasingly chosen to live in urban areas, where there has been a rise in
population density per square kilometer. C) Source: Data from Global
Monitoring Laboratory, by Pieter Tans, NOAA/GML
(www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/) and Ralph Keeling, Scripps
Institution of Oceanography (scrippsco2.ucsd.edu/).23 Note: There has been a
trend of increase in the average emissions of carbon dioxide since the begging
of the past century, which has intensified from 1950 onwards. D) Source:
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Data from NOAA National Centers for Environmental information, Climate at
a Glance: Global Time Series. https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/cag/global/timeseries/globe/land_ocean/ytd/12/1880-2019.24 Note: Both land and ocean
water temperatures, have risen considerably since the late 70s, were the land
temperature has shown a sharper increase of close to 2 degrees Celsius since
then.

The changes in temperature and human activities, are placing an
unsustainable pressure on natural resources, amongst which, water is
the absolute irreplaceable element for human survival. Over the last
century, the sheer volume of human water usage, has contributed with
an exacerbated trend of fresh water consumption (Figure 2-A).25
Renewable internal flow, including river water flows and groundwater
from rainfall represents a good indicator of water security and scarcity
in relation to population measures.26 Recent reports show that the per
capita availability of renewable freshwater resources has fallen sharply
since the 1960s (Figure 2-A), sending regions such as North Africa,
Middle East and South Asia into extremely high levels of water stress.27
Data collected by the Pacific Institute Project on the world’s water
resources conflicts, further exposes a sharp increase in the number of
conflicts in recent years, which doubled in the last decade compared to
the previous one (Figure 2-B).28 The vast majority of the conflicts that
took place from 2010 to 2019 were located in Western Asia, SubSaharan Africa, and Southern Asia (totalizing over 70 percent of all
conflicts).29
Figure 2. Water Resources and Related Conflicts.

A) Source: Data from Hannah Ritchie and Max Roser, “Water Use and Stress,”
Published online at OurWorldInData.org, 2017, first published in 2015, revised July
2018. https://ourworldindata.org/water-use-stress.30 Note: Worldwide fresh water
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use has increased sharply for the last 100 years, and this has been followed by a
strong decline in renewable internal freshwater resources. B) Source: Pacific Institute.
2019. The Water Conflict Chronology. Oakland,
California. https://www.worldwater.org/water-conflict/.31 Note: The number of water
related conflicts has more than doubled over the last decade, as compared with the
previous one, overall exposing a strong trend of increase since 1980.

These environmental changes are triggering a negative chain effect,
given by, for example,
•

•

•

•

•

The rise in the ocean temperature and CO2 precipitations, are
driving an increased concentration of carbon dioxide per volume
water, at such an unprecedented pace that is resulting in the
acidification of the oceans and is affecting its ecosystems.32
Ocean water temperature rise has also been demonstrated to
decrease fisheries availability, which, if not managed, can alter
the marine food-web supply.33 The upsurge in temperatures will
additionally contribute to ocean’s surface water evaporation,
altering the overall water cycle and further influencing fresh
water evaporation patterns.34
Drier environments, combined with anthropogenic deforestation
will increase the likelihood of weakened forests resilience to
climate stress.35
Crop production of major commodities as wheat and maize were
previously shown to be sensitive to climate change, and crops
decline in some regions can offset the increase in yields normally
achieved through technological advancements and fertilizers.36
Extreme weather events will drive a risk escalation and
uncertainty in global food systems, where food inequality and
insecurity will likely increase; affecting more on countries that
are already suffering hunger.37

Overall, climate change leads to a fragility risk profile that comprises
local resources competition, livelihood insecurity and migration,
extreme weather disasters, volatile food prices and provision,
transboundary water management, sea-level rise and costal
degradation and unintended effects of climate policies.38 Should such
events continue to unfold, they will have the potential to drive
humankind into a competition for resources, which will affect the
overall security environment. Left uncontrolled, this could set the
grounds for the development of climate change linked-terrorism.
Environmental-Linked Terrorism
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During the Gulf War in 1991, the Iraqi forces led to large oil spills in the
Persian Gulf and the torching and sabotaging of multiple oil wells that
prompted significant smoke and oily clouds that obscured the area for
days.39 Then president George Bush soon classified these acts as
environmental terrorism.40 More generally, they denoted a methodical
military strategy in disrupting the environment to use it as tool of war,
which was more akin to an environmental warfare.41 The events
nonetheless, sparked a debate within the already contested
conceptualization of terrorism, as to define which actions could be
considered in the realm of environmental terrorism.42
While there are still many arguments around defining terrorism, a
general view is that terrorism requires a “deliberate use or threat to use
violence against civilians in order to attain political, ideological, or
religious aims.”43 In line with this take, it was outlined that the
objectives of terrorism are directed to coerce a political course of
action, whereas its means always include “the use or threat of use of
violence… that is directed at a symbolic target.”44 What differentiate
terrorism from other forms of violence, is the fear of that symbolic
violence against the larger population.45 Thereafter, environmental
terrorism takes place when the symbolic violence disrupts the
environment.46
In consequence, environmental terrorism requires an intentional act,
or threat, of violence directly against the environment, through either
war or terror. Such violence creates indiscriminate fear, due to the
pernicious consequences of the destruction of the environment, which
will eventually cause direct harm to the population. Lastly, the overall
objective of the attacks is to force political decisions.
The Threat of Eco-Terrorism
The debate over the classification of environmental terrorism soon
turned into the construction of an eco-terrorism threat. The Animal
and Earth Liberation Movement (AELM), which included several
environmentalists and animal’s rights groups, came to be considered
part of a so-called eco-terrorism surge.47 The Animal Liberation Front
(ALF) and the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) appeared to be the most
distinctive organizations in this movement.
The ELF may represent a blend of anarchists and apocalyptic
extremists whose philosophies are rooted in Marxism, socialism,
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feminism, postmodernism and Eastern religions, and who strived for
the end of modern civilization.48 The organization’s views were further
linked to the likes of Theodore Kaczynski, and it was signaled as a
threat to nuclear facilities.49 The ALF instead, drifted from groups such
as Greenpeace and was more concerned with animal rights issues, but
was considered to act in solidarity with the ELF.50 Both groups were
further argued as the main drivers of an overlooked wave of EcoTerrorism threat, which extended from 1980 to 2012.51 It was also
suggested, that organizations such as the ELF and the ALF could be
equated to Al-Qaeda and ISIS ideological war, which were matched by
a cult of nature and antagonizing stand against western democracies
based on a “bi-centric vision with equally violent means.”52 The Global
Terrorism Database (GTD) produced by the National Consortium for
the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START),
University of Maryland, contains records of worldwide terrorist events
since 1970.53 From that dataset, it becomes apparent that the
comparison might not be as linear, considering that both, Al-Qaeda,
and its affiliates and ISIS, lunched a total 8,445 attacks causing at least
54,164 deaths from 1992 to 2018.54 Yet, such narratives propelled a
strong official countering intelligence response in the United States,
which eventually suffocated these movements.55
For others, these groups were considered part of a movement of
movement that pursued the defense of the environment and animal
rights by committing crimes of economic sabotage, but who rejected
violence against individuals and did not intend to provoke a sense of
fear.56 In this view, the modus operandi and history of behavior of the
ELF for example, was wrongly interpreted as eco-terrorism, as it only
amounted to an unlawful form of political militancy.57 It was further
stated that the coining of the term ecoterrorism itself, was unjustly
built in the United States through by private corporative lobbies, mass
media bias, and global warming deniers, which overall staged a
vilification of radical environmentalists and permeated the government
response.58 From all of the ALF and ELF incidents noted from 1979 to
2010, none resulted in physical injuries or fatalities, and yet they were
met with a strong intelligence joint task force and a counter-terrorism
strategy that was largely led by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Intelligence
(FBI).59
The GTD data verifies the activity of the organizations involved in the
eco-terrorism movement (Figure 3).60 The ALF has allegedly claimed a
recent number of vandalism acts in the United States.61
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Notwithstanding those claims, the latest attacks recorded by the GTD,
were in 2016, and 2015 for the ELF (Figure 3).62 The two groups
combined launched 189 attacks from 1984 to 2016, but those attacks
did not provoke any fatalities.63 This justifies the debate that the acts
performed by these kinds of groups relate to illegal activities against
property such as vandalism, sabotage, or trespassing, which may not
directly equate to acts of terrorism.64 However, the broadening of the
concept of domestic terrorism by the FBI in 2002, which included
attacks on property, and the uncritical acceptance of the term ecoterrorism instead of ecotage, led to the treatment of these
environmental activists as terrorists.65
Other organizations related to the ALEM movement, however, have
shown to adopt creeds that are violent. The Justice Department (JD), a
group that resonated in 1999 with 14 attacks (Figure 3), was effectively
a splinter from the ALF, but different from the central group, it aspired
to utilize violence against people.66 Whereas the JD went virtually
extinct in 2010, the Animals Right Extremists (ARE), a similarly violent
organization resurged in 2017 (Figure 3).67
A reviving trend for the ARE and the ITS was also recorded in recent
years (Figure 3). The ITS has already caused 37 deaths since 2011, and
together with the ARE, they remain the only extreme
environmentalism organizations to have ever caused casualties.68 This
already suggests that these actors may pose a different threat as that of
the original ALEM movement.
Originated in Mexico in 2011, the ITS was part of an international ecoanarchist movement, which had a violent profile and an inclination to
use low reach bombs against pro-nuclear lobbies and scientists.69
Inspired by winds of eco-fascism and the Ted Kaczynski’s manifests,
the ITS openly declared its decision to take violent action against
people that were advancing technology and destroying the wilderness.70
The group continues to pledge for indiscriminate violence against
progress, and while is now active in Chile and Mexico, it has recently
claimed responsibility for attacks in Greece.71
The Deep Green Resistance (DGR) is another young organization
holding radical anti-civilization - anti-progress agendas that is also
rapidly expanding.72 Its methodical strategic plan, and its tendency
towards violence, have catapulted this green-anarchist group, together
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with the ITS, as a worrying bioterrorism threat.73 However, this
organization does not register attacks on the GTD.
Figure 3. Terrorist Attacks Linked to the Eco-Terrorism Movement.

Source: Data from Global Terrorism Database, (GTD, 2019), START, University of
Maryland. https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.74 Note: The groups included within the
Eco-Terrorism movement showed a heightened activity during the years 1998 to
2005, but showed a significantly lower number of attacks for the last five years. (The
data used for the groups considered, included the words: Environment, Eco, Wild,
Earth, Animal and Justice Department, with at least 3 attacks from 1970 to 2018, or
at least 1 attack since 2014).

There is also a current increase in extreme right violence, coupled with
the rise of groups based on eco-fascists, or anarcho-primitivism
views.75 In attention to this, the coming of an ecologically justified neofascism trend, identified as the Avocado Politics, may become a climate
change related threat.76 Under this view, the green rhetoric of climate
change and the environmental emergency, may justify an agenda that
includes white restricted opportunities, the need for preservation of a
perceived superior race, hoarding of the powerful and a justification for
exclusion.77 Considering that the ITS shares some of those views, the
momentum could re-ignite a transnational radical movement with the
potential to grow into the once trumpeted eco-terrorism threat.
Overall, the movement linked with eco-terrorism has traditionally
engaged in illegal acts of ecotage to pursue environmental policy
66
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changes. The movement has caused damage to civil rights and
properties they considered ecologically destructive, but has not been
characterized by targeting the environment, nor any human lives.
While the classification of its participants as terrorists might be
contested, the development of groups such as the ITS warrants its
monitoring.
Looming Threats
The lack of consistency in defining eco-terrorism or environmental
terrorism has given oxygen to ill constructed policies and State
responses. Other academics seemingly challenged the initial
ecoterrorism perceptions nurtured within the United States, and
considered ecoterrorism to represent a minority of the actions exerted
by radical environmentalists that were not central to the movement’s
objectives.78 The Institute for Economic & Peace (IEP), which yearly
reviews the Global Terrorism Index based on the GTD records,
recognizes only three broad categories of terrorism, namely: Political,
nationalist or separatist and religious.79 The IEP further notes that
environmental terrorists are more likely to be affiliated to a specific
terrorist group, their activity overlaps with the main types of terrorism,
and that they are unlikely to target the loss of life as a main goal.80
Yet, the hardening of the state’s policies against environmental activists
has been re-ignited across the globe, and the increasing influence of
international corporations into state powers has further encouraged
aggressive expansionist politics at a potential cost for civil rights.81 This
is leaving a diminished capacity for a system of control to private
ambitions, which may only encourage radical forms of reactive
activism.82 States are now resonating the term eco-terrorism to avert
potential dangerous environmental activism, targeting protestors as
terrorists with extreme outcomes for the protection of civil liberties.83
For example, at least a dozen of environmental activists were deported
back, or denied entry to Poland, in occasion of the 2018 United Nations
Climate conference in Katowice, because they were considered a threat
to the national security.84 During 2019, forty-six environmental
activists were killed in the Philippines, because these people were
categorized as terrorists in light of the anti-terrorism bill passed by the
government of Duterte in 2019.85 This followed the decision of
president Duterte in 2018 to place 600 indigenous and environmental
right advocates, which included a United Nations special
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representative, into a terrorist list.86 In the United States, corporative
lobbies influencing congress members seem to be claiming that
environmental militants and indigenous protestors should be treated as
terrorists.87 These lobbies further pushed for the passing of a bill that
would curtail these dangerous actions and stop terrorism.88
In line with these views, the United Kingdom has recently included
Greenpeace and Extinction Rebellion, alongside various extremist right
wing groups, in the police counter-terrorism guide used in an antiradicalization campaigns across the country.89 While this was seen by
some as a sign of a worsened persecution of environmental activists,
Australia has engaged in a similar trend including in its 2015 counterterrorism booklet, examples of environmental activism as a road to
radicalization.90 The UK police have further used reproachable tactics
of infiltration and incapacitating protest policing strategies against
environmental activists, exposing the inadequacy and exaggerated
moniker of domestic extremism opposed to these groups.91 This is an
ominously development which might see the reactions of climate
change activists being met with an asymmetrical state response and the
repression of civil liberties, all in the name of counter terrorism.
IEP experts have declared that government’s inaction and lack of trust
in democratic process may see those behind a climate change
movement to reach a tipping point and retort to violence.92 The recent
comeback from the ITS, which also visits the lines of the likes of the
Freedom Club organization, inspired in Ted Kaczynski legacy, could
turn into a beacon for eco-fascist groups.93 While eco-movements were
traditionally linked to the left, in times of an increased threat from
right wing activism, these actors can notice the rhetoric of antiimmigration and militarization of resources in response to the climate
crisis, and potentially engage in environmental linked-extremism.94
Accordingly, this tipping point, could be reached from the left and right
extreme of the ideological spectrum. The problem of climate change is
therefore a common ground for potentially radicalized individuals from
both extremes, who have negative views against progress, technologies,
increased population trends, and immigration movements. For some,
this tendency may also represent a future risk for the rise of a
dangerous ideology identified as bioconservatism.95
In times of generalized popular upset, the role of negative climate
policies can be of concern. As reviewed by others, dominant groups
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within a society may have privileged access to resources, a situation
that some states may protect by marginalizing minorities.96 These
ostracized members may then engage in violence to restore the
discriminative grievance, overall exposing the importance of equality
before the law and the protection of civil rights to avoid setting the
grounds for domestic terrorism in modern states.97
Consequently, increasing state repression and loss of civil rights
coupled with the decline in essential resources availability can
potentially exacerbate popular turmoil as a last resort against
governments’ climate inactions. These conflicts can potentially set the
grounds for radical individuals to tip the point and trigger a form of
ideological terrorism based on an environmental creed. As these
individuals target the preservation of the environment, this threat may
take a new form of eco-terrorism, where not only property, but also
lives could be at risk.
Conflicts and Environmental Terrorism
Climate change and the stress it places in environmental resources, has
been linked to conflicts of various nature. For some, this relationship
has smaller effects within country-armed conflicts, as compared to
other drivers of conflicts.98 Others have shown that climate stressors
are linked to increased opportunity for violence and conflicts in areas of
low living standards and poor governance.99
However, climate change has now been recognized to fuel greater
political instability and conflicts due to resources competition and
increasing global insecurity that places the most affected areas at the
mercy of insurgencies, organized crime, and terrorism recruitment.100
In support of that concept, extreme temperature deviations in the SubSaharan region have been linked to an increased risk of political
violence in the form of protesting and rioting.101 Similarly, broad
temperature increase patters were further correlated to an increased
risk of conflicts, and a potential worsening of climate change
adaptability.102
The resources affected by climate change are multiples, yet the struggle
for water, is at the forefront of this race. The lack of water, particularly
in already highly stressed areas as Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, is giving
terrorists tactical advantages who, by cutting its supply or
contaminating its sources, are employing a form of environmental.103
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These strategic advantages have been exploded by different terrorist
organizations. Al-Shabaab, for example, has moved from a weakened
position due to government retaliation, to exert control over water
supply chains to the cities, reinstating by these means a demonstration
of authority without even holding those cities.104 The group has learnt
that losing its strategic power over water supply points may mean their
demise, and therefore it maintains effective control over the rivers
surrounding cities and routes of access to fresh water.105
The Sahel region of Africa is a hotspot for climate change-linked
instability, and it is anticipated to give local terrorist organizations
further opportunities for development. Groups such as Boko Haram,
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement for Oneness
and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA, also known by its French
acronyms, MUJAO) may have an increased prospect to radicalize the
population against the states further.106 This is a prime region for water
related conflicts, where for the struggles surrounding the Lake Chad
Basin for example, have set climate change consequences as a conflict
risk multiplier.107 Resources insecurity has pushed the northeast region
of Nigeria to fall under an extreme risk of famine, and placed 7 million
people at emergency levels of food insecurity, rising political grievance,
and conflicts over water and land.108 In such scenarios, Boko Haram
has not missed the opportunity to explode the inhabitants around the
main river basins and added focal risk factors for the regional
hydropower resources.109
Temperature changes alone can be a concerning risk for the
development of terrorism in some countries within the Sahel. It has
been shown that an increase in mean temperatures, particularly in
Nigeria, has an incremental effect on the probability of terror events,
where by every 1 centigrade increase the likelihood of Islamism
terrorism surges by 4 to 6 percent.110 These authors argued that
escalating ethnic/religious heterogeneity is a factor in the surge of
violence and conflicts, which in the case of Nigeria; it also increases the
State’s odds for the occurrence of terror events.111 These are not issues
only linked to Africa. The dawn of the Arab Spring in Syria, has exposed
the menace of environmental and provided evidence for the possible
security consequences of climate change.
Water scarcity and extended droughts have been cited amongst major
factor in driving the political instability that resulted in the Syrian civil
war.112 For years, Syrians were ravaged by droughts and water shortage
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that significantly hurt crops yields and destroyed the livelihood of
hundreds of thousands of farmers, affecting 1.3million Syrians and
leaving other 2 to 3 million living in extreme poverty.113 The Assad
regime did not support the affected areas, mismanaged the water, and
cut subsidies to farmers, which led to the internal displacement of rural
inhabitants towards the cities, where they were only met with rising
unemployment and government neglect.114 Most of these so-called
climate refugees were relegated to the outskirts of cities such as Aleppo
and Damascus, or were stablished in Dara, where the pro-democratic
movement of the Arab Spring and the uprising against the government
started.115 The civil unrest was followed by a power vacuum that gave
room to rise of ISIS, which soon after learnt to use the environment on
its favor.116 During the conflict, ISIS targeted water installations and
deviated water flows to exert control over the provision of services,
which became a tool of political dominance and a psychological
terrorism strategy.117 In 2014, ISIS extended these strategies to Iraq
where the group closed local dams, effectively leaving large areas under
draught stress, and threatened the Shiite community with cutting water
supply to their regions.118
Water stress has not been the only resource to be weaponized by ISIS.
The group has also noted the spread of wild fires in already stressed
environments as a climate change led strategy.119 In Syria and Iraq,
ISIS has taken advantage of the dry, hot, and windy climate to use
extended arson wildfires, driving the destruction of crops and
agricultural resources of local farmers.120 During 2019, ISIS prompted
the use of fire in Syria and Iraq to punish the alleged lack of tax
payments by regional farmers, and recently, the group used this
menace as a propaganda for terror, encouraging its followers to note
before them the “millions of acres… to burn.”121 The use of common
arson warfare technic at the hands of terrorists, in these increasingly
stressed environments, may only turn already extended catastrophic
fire seasons in a completely new menace of its own.
The states fragility and natural resources vulnerability, have not
escaped the attention of other terrorist groups outside Syria, showing
that these may not be isolated events, but an escalating trend in the use
of the environment for terrorism.122 The roadmap to the Yemeni civil
war involves a similarly complex web of actors and the setting of proxy
wars.123 In such scenario, for example, increased water scarcity
provided tactic advantages to both, the states and non-state operators.
Submerged in a conflict since 2015, Yemen has been identified as one
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of the most water-stressed countries worldwide, situation that has been
aggravated due to failed government policies, increasing climate
change pressure and operating actors blocking either its delivery or its
access.124 In fragrant violation of the international laws of war, by 2018,
the coalition forces led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates
attacked the Yemeni civil water and electrical infrastructures more than
100 times. 125 This contributed with a persistent outbreak of cholera,
the displacement of 1.3 million people and a health care system
collapse.126 In this ravaged scenario, the Houthi rebels have blockaded
the cities under their control, allegedly confiscating water at
checkpoints or withholding its access to enemies.127 Conversely, AlQaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) implemented a servicing
strategy of providing security by refurbishing water wells and mains.128
Displaced Yemeni individuals further reported that water and energy
scarcity started after the conflict began. 129 Water supply then fell under
local governments or formalized groups, providing an example of how
climate change can relate to conflict-induced resources scarcity, where
water can be used as a weapon or a tool of control.130
Conflicts and people’s marginalization from peace and resources have
further become the marks for a spiraling road to terrorism recruitment.
The lack of trust in the government to solve the hydrological crisis in
Nigeria for instance, has sent people to a journey of frustration and
helplessness, which has taken many in the search of alternative
livelihoods to join Boko Haram.131 The negative effects that lowered
living conditions due to intensifying droughts can inflict at a personal
level have also been shown to influence individual motivations and
bolster the likelihood of a personal decision to join political violence. 132
State failure to provide for human security, including basic civil rights
and god governance, has equally been linked to the ability of terrorist
groups, as Boko Haram, to polarize individuals towards joining their
organizations.133 The areas most affected by extreme weather events
and increased scarcity of resources therefore, become vulnerable spots
for recruitment, where terrorist groups can offer means of life,
economic viability and grievance appeasement.134
These precedents demonstrate an increased targeting of the
environment to induce fear in the population as to achieve political
goals. In such context, attacks to an already challenged environment,
characterizes environmental terrorism. The future shaping of this
threat may take unpredictable forms as climate change consequences
continue to unfold.
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Conclusion
Climate change is an associated factor to the increase of violent
conflicts and regional destabilization, which may only worsen as
temperature continue to rise. The escalating scarcity of basic resources
such as water, the increased desertification of agricultural regions, and
the overall rise in temperatures have all shown to bolster political
instability and state fragility. The link between climate change and
terrorism is, now, one defined by the evolution of strategies and the
opportunity for recruitment using the environment stress as a form of
control. This is a strategy likely to be applied by state and non-state
actors alike, and includes the damage of the environment by acts of war
or terror, which leads to Environmental terrorism. Eco-terrorism,
which traditionally included acts of ecotage in defense of the
environment, and the promotion of related environmental policy
changes, does not appear to be a current threat. However,
environmental activists are being increasingly categorized and targeted
as terrorists by well stablished democracies. The exacerbated role of
these states may fuel a sense of injustice and desperateness capable of
compelling radical individuals to join the likes of the ITS, or to drive
themselves a new terrorism threat. This could trigger a security risk
effect at the heart of advanced regions, where not yet the scarcity of
water, but the loss of civil rights would potentiate the rise of a new form
of eco-terrorism. Thereafter, the conditions linked to climate change
have provided both, opportunity for environmental terrorism
developments in areas of resources scarcity, and a potential platform
for new form of terrorism born from extreme anti-progress ideologies.
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